tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-131797432577932217.post4379403293596633530..comments2024-03-28T08:07:07.514-04:00Comments on American Admiralty Books: American Admiralty Bookshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13580284626647946681noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-131797432577932217.post-1466915890077882962013-04-29T17:09:14.808-04:002013-04-29T17:09:14.808-04:00I understand the private aid issues, and have been...I understand the private aid issues, and have been in cases where the obstruction changed its configuration to a point where a more stringent lighting configuration was required, where that represents an obvious oversight of the facility owner not to determine if the changes precipitated a higher lighting standard. But the hypothetical above (and that is all it is until evidence emerges) is based on the observed bullying behavior of MMS' prior Royalty management process. Imagine a permit showing the out-of-service BOP and its pedigree being submitted in the drilling plan documentation (which would be a requirement); said plan calls for the required shoreside maintenance and testing to be done on the BOP with spud in of some date "A" and MMS saying the BOP looks fine - deploy it and spud in earlier. Defying their request is like telling the traffic cop "I don't want to show you my license." The lightening speed reorganization of responsibilities at the former MMS and my personal experience recognizing the primacy of the Royalty folks over technical issues are what make this scenario plausible, coupled with an absence of any criminal negligence charge - something that would have certainly been pursued if BP had fraudulently represented the condition of the BOP, like saying it was inside its maintenance interval when it was not.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-131797432577932217.post-10838608839214831032013-04-28T22:41:25.222-04:002013-04-28T22:41:25.222-04:00The American Admiralty Bureau Commentators don'...The American Admiralty Bureau Commentators don't indicate any real case exposure to drilling technology. However the Bureau had extensive case exposure to private aids to navigation. The Bureau participated in quite a few cases where industries established a permitted obstruction in a navigation area with day marks and lights, or the absence of lights approved by the Coast Guard. Then 20 years later after marinas and other nearby facilities dramatically increased vessel traffic these obstructions still carried the lights and marks mandated by the Coast Guard for a nearly deserted location twenty years prior. In each case of allision where a highly vulnerable recreational boat failed to see the inadequately marked structure, the obstruction owner attempted to subrogate against the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard's position was always that responsibility for the effectiveness of the lights rested with the permittee, the obstruction owner. None of the obstruction owning defendants were ever able to bring the Coast Guard into the litigation. We predict that the same will prove true for BP, the MMS approval of equipment used regardless of circumstances, will not relieve BP of ultimate responsibility/liability for the effectiveness of the equipment employed. The California mooring buoy cases of the American Admiralty Bureau are the only cases we are aware of in the offshore context where a defendant tried to reduce or shift liability to a regulatory agency for inadequate regulation, or lax enforcement. It didn't work, all of the precedent cited by the judges indicated that regulatory agencies do not have any responsibility or liability for ultimate effectiveness of equipment as actually employed.American Admiralty Bookshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13580284626647946681noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-131797432577932217.post-61178562775764231842013-04-28T21:57:54.808-04:002013-04-28T21:57:54.808-04:00The aspect of this case I have never heard discuss...The aspect of this case I have never heard discussed is the matter of the Blow Out Preventer (BOP) and its maintenance history or "pedigree." The BOP was reportedly beyond its maintenance cycle, but was allowed to be used by then Minerals Management Service, who would have certainly known this before drilling would have been permitted to begin. It has been supposed by those with more detailed knowledge of the regulatory construct that the role of the agency (MMS) in allowing this BOP to be used was a decision based more on accelerating the eventual royalty collections than the technical risks of such a decision, and that that error led to the near immediate reorganization of the agency in order to separate the technical approvals, royalty management, and operational oversight functions. Do such factors play into the decisions by the courts? Does a possibility that the approving authority permitted (and may have even encouraged) the use of a BOP outside its prescribed maintenance parameters absolve BP of any share in the alleged negligence? I would like to know the answers...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com