Monday, August 26, 2013

HOW FAR WILL THE DRAGON SWIM? THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OPINION

Naval Interests:

  A NEW CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH REPORT IS OUT ON CHINESE NAVAL INTENTIONS.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

Editor's Note: In this August 8, 2013 paper by the Congressional research service we find a well reasoned alternative view to the intentions of the Dragon, but not different enough from our view or the fictional projection of Larry Bond's "SHATTERED TRIDENT" that we recently reviewed  to convince us that any relief from the tensions in the China Seas are in sight, or that the potential for this lapse into a shooting naval war is any less.  We believe the author of this report Ronald O' Rourke has correctly described the Chinese naval building program and short term strategy correctly. He articulates the idea that while China has as a long term goal the pushing of American naval influence back to Pearl Harbor, its naval building plan is basically for a high end near shore (out to the "First Island Chain") force capable of excluding any combination of American and allied forces out of the China Seas. He speculates that China is only interested in building a low end real blue water capability available for long distance anti piracy. 

 

 Unfortunately he makes no mention of the new 900+ ship Chinese Coast Guard, the soon to be operational Chinese air craft carrier, or China's recent demonstrated mastery of underway replenishment. All events covered in these pages in recent weeks. The evolution of the World's largest coast guard by China we think, does not signal a deescalation of tensions on the illegal claims that China makes on islands of its neighbors. It simply works better than continued navy aggression in tandem with Chinese claims before UN tribunals basing their claims on bogus history and claims of "effective administration". 

 
                                                                                                      Naval replenishment operations
  Aerial View of Senkaku/Diauyu Islands and rocks From Google Public domain Images

Mr. Rourke's opinion that a war between the United States over these island claims is unlikely because both sides have too much at stake with their interlinked economies would be valid if expressed as simply a serious speed bump in the path of war. But given continued , even if more sophisticated (like the switch to coast guard forces) tactics as the spear point in the island acquisition campaign  the likelihood of diminished Chinese aggression in the region seems nil. We see the development of carrier task forces and the practice of underway replenishment as evidence of a drive for a naval force that may or may not be capable of truly global operations but definitely  would be capable of driving the United States back to Pearl Harbor , a stated policy goal of China. The continuing aggression heightens the odds of an incident escalating into war every and any day. The failure of the United States to make its intentions clear, now while we still have a naval edge increases the chances of China's coastal neighbors forming a formal alliance  and attempting a limited war as described in the fictional SHATTERED TRIDENT. 

                                                                     

 Despite our reservations Mr. O'Rourke's paper is important and should be read by more than the Congressional audience and naval professionals. We reprint a summary and table of contents below and a link to the entire document. We urge every American to learn all you can about the Chinese actions to try and own the "first island chain". The issues seem to be a non event to U.S. news sources but carry the potential for a sudden over night escalation into a the first real naval shooting war since WW II.  The time to act intelligently is now, to act intelligently you need information. For the Congress, which Mark Twain once described as America's "only organized criminal class" to act intelligently they must have input from their constituents. For the present administration to act intelligently, there  has to appear to be no other choice. 


China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs August 8, 2013 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf


Summary (click on link for larger print) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf


The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, 

including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The 

question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for 
countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget. 
Two DOD strategy and budget documents released in January 2012 state that U.S. military 
strategy will place a renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and that as a result, there will 
be a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated 
that notwithstanding reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be maintained and strengthened. 
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for 
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or 
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some 
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of 
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could 
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance 
in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, 
including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. 
In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy 
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political 
evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals 
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere. 
China’s naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of 
weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and 
surface ships. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in 
maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises. 
Observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort has been to 
develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, 
observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access 
force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, 
delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Observers 
believe that China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is 
increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China’s 
territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s view—a minority 
view among world nations—that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-
mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); protecting China’s sea lines of communications; 
protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in the 
Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a major world power. 
Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming 
years will be large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces 
while also adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the 
world; the Navy’s ability to counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in 
response to China’s maritime anti-access capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Issue for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 1
Scope, Sources, and Terminology ............................................................................................. 2
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 3
Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort .................................................................... 3
Date of Inception ................................................................................................................. 3
Elements of Modernization Effort ....................................................................................... 3
Limitations and Weaknesses................................................................................................ 3
Goals of Naval Modernization Effort .................................................................................. 4
Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort ..................................................... 10
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) .............................................................................. 10
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) ................................................................................. 11
Submarines ........................................................................................................................ 12
Aircraft Carriers and Carrier-Based Aircraft ..................................................................... 19
Surface Combatants........................................................................................................... 24
Amphibious Ships ............................................................................................................. 33
Land-Based Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) .......................................... 37
Nuclear and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons ....................................................... 38
Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems .................................................................. 39
Chinese Naval Operations Away from Home Waters .............................................................. 39
Numbers of Chinese Ships and Aircraft; Comparisons to U.S. Navy ..................................... 41
Numbers Chinese Navy Ships and Naval Aircraft ............................................................ 41
Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities .............................................................. 43
DOD Response to China Naval Modernization....................................................................... 45
Renewed DOD Emphasis on Asia-Pacific Region ............................................................ 45
January 5, 2012, Strategic Guidance Document ............................................................... 46
January 26, 2012, Document on Selected FY2013 Program Decisions ............................ 47
September 2011 Press Report About New Defense Planning Guidance ........................... 48
October 3, 2012, Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter .................................. 49
Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept .......................................................................................... 51
August 2013 Press Report on Revisions to War Plans ...................................................... 51
Navy Response to China Naval Modernization....................................................................... 52
Force Posture and Basing Actions ..................................................................................... 52
Acquisition Programs ........................................................................................................ 53
Training and Forward-Deployed Operations ..................................................................... 57
Statements of Confidence .................................................................................................. 58
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 59
Future Size of U.S. Navy ......................................................................................................... 59
Air-Sea Battle Concept ............................................................................................................ 62
Navy’s Ability to Counter China’s ASBMs ............................................................................. 68
Breaking the ASBM’s Kill Chain ...................................................................................... 68
AAW and BMD Capability of Flight III DDG-51 Destroyer ............................................ 69
Endo-Atmospheric Target for Simulating DF-21D ASBM ............................................... 70
Press Reports ..................................................................................................................... 71
Navy’s Ability to Counter China’s Submarines ....................................................................... 76
Navy’s Fleet Architecture ........................................................................................................ 78

TO ACCESS THE ENTIRE REPORT CLICK HERE: 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf


                                      


No comments:

Post a Comment