U.S.Navy Photos of Chinese Some elements of Chinese Sea Power
OUR REPRINTS OF PARTS OF AND LINKS TO THE LATEST CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH REPORTS ON CHINESE SEAPOWER AND WHAT IT MEANS TO THE U.S.
China Naval Modernization: Implications for http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and
Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
December 10, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33153
Summary
The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort,
including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The
question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for
countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.
Two DOD strategy and budget documents released in January 2012 state that U.S. military
strategy will place a renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and that as a result, there will
be a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated
that notwithstanding reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military
presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be maintained and strengthened.
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance
in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries,
including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.
In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political
evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
China’s naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of
weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and
surface ships. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in
maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises.
Observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort has been to
develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal,
observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access
force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that,
delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Observers
believe that China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is
increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China’s
territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s view—a minority
view among world nations—that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-
mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); protecting China’s sea lines of communications;
protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in the
Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a major world power.
Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming
years will be large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces
while also adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the
world; the Navy’s ability to counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in
response to China’s maritime anti-access capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed
fleet architecture.
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Introduction
Issue for Congress
The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort,
including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The
Department of Defense (DOD) states that “China’s rise as a major international actor is likely to
stand out as a defining feature of the strategic landscape of the early 21st Century,” and that
China’s military “is now venturing into the global maritime domain, a sphere long dominated by
the U.S. Navy.”1
Admiral Michael Mullen, the then-Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, stated
in June 2010 that “I have moved from being curious to being genuinely concerned” about China’s
military programs.2
The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort is
of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering
improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget. An October 19, 2011,
press report stated:
The US Navy views the Asia-Pacific region as a top strategic priority even as it faces
possible budget cuts that could curtail other global missions, the naval chief said Wednesday
[October 19].
With China’s clout rising and its military might expanding, President Barack Obama’s
deputies and military commanders increasingly portray Asia as a key to American national
security.
The new chief of naval operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, echoed that view and
suggested growing pressure on the US defense budget would not derail plans to focus on the
Pacific region.
“Asia will be clearly a priority and we will adjust our operations accordingly,” Greenert told
reporters in a teleconference.3
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance
1
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2011. Washington, 2011. Executive summary and p. 1.
2
Viola Gienger, “U.S. Concern Over China’s Military Intent Growing, Mullen Says,” Bloomberg.com, June 10, 2010.
See also Daniel Ten Kate, “U.S. Criticism Of China’s Military May Overshadow Asian Security Meeting,”
Bloomberg.com, July 15, 2010; and Jon Rabiroff, “Mullen Moves From ‘Curious’ To ‘Concerned’ Over China’s
Military,” Stripes.com, July 21, 2010.
See also the February 28, 2012, testimony of Admiral Robert Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, before the
Senate Armed Services Committee in Appendix A.
3
Dan De Luce, “For US Navy, Asia is crucial priority: admiral,” Agence France-Presse, October 19, 2011. China Nava
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